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The opening line in Aristotle’s Metaphysics asserts that “humans desire to 
understand”, establishing understanding as the defining characteristic of the 
human mind and human species. What is understanding and what role does it play 
in cognition, what advantages does it confer, what brain mechanisms are involved? 
The Webster’s Dictionary defines understanding as “apprehending general rela-
tions in a multitude of particulars.” A proposal discussed in this chapter defines 
understanding as a form of active inference in self-adaptive systems seeking to 
expand their inference domains while minimizing metabolic costs incurred in the 
expansions. Under the same proposal, understanding is viewed as an advanced 
adaptive mechanism involving self-directed construction of mental models estab-
lishing relations between domain entities. Understanding complements learning 
and serves to overcome the inertia of learned behavior when conditions are unfa-
miliar or deviate from those experienced in the past. While learning is common 
across all animals, understanding is unique to the human species. This chapter will 
unpack these notions, focusing on different facets of understanding. The proposal 
formulates hypotheses regarding the underlying neuronal mechanisms, attempting 
to assess their plausibility and reconcile them with the recent ideas and findings 
concerning brain functional architecture.
Keywords: neuronal mechanisms, consciousness, understanding, brain function, 
functional architecture, neuronal correlations of understanding
1. Introduction
The concept of ‘mental models’, i.e. memory constructs acting as “small-scale 
models of reality” intervening between stimuli and responses was introduced 
in [1], and subsequently elaborated by multiple authors applying the concept in 
the context of various disciplines [2–6]. More general, domain-invariant theories 
conceptualize models as inferential frameworks enabling deductive and other forms 
of reasoning [7, 8], in particular, reasoning by analogy [9].
“Reagan. What need one?
King Lear. O, reason not the need: our basest beggars
Are in the poorest thing superfluous:
Allow not nature more than nature needs,
Man's life's as cheap as beast's…”
William Shakespeare. King Lear, Act 1, Scene 4
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The theory of understanding discussed in this chapter (the VAN theory for-
mulated in [10–12]) centers on the notions of self-adaptive processes in virtual 
associative networks (VAN) and defines understanding as a human-specific form of 
active inference subsumed under the principles of active inference and variational 
free energy minimization advanced in [13, 14]. The theory contends that curbing 
metabolic costs and regulating the dynamics of energy processes in the brain have 
been critical factors in the evolution of intelligence, culminating in the emergence 
of mental modeling mechanisms in humans that made possible explosive growth 
in the variety of activities a person can engage in without exploding either the 
number of neurons and/or the metabolic costs of neuronal processes necessary for 
organizing those activities. According to the theory, mental models are simultane-
ous memory structures imposing tight constraints on their constituent components 
and thus sharply reducing the number of degrees of freedom available to them. 
Reduction in the number of degrees of freedom minimizes the amount of process-
ing in performing cognitive tasks, yielding two interrelated benefits: curbing 
energy demands and giving rise to abilities that define human intelligence and are 
inherent in the understanding capacity, i.e. prediction, explanation, and planning.
These ideas are explored in the present chapter, heeding the advice attributed 
to Einstein and suggesting that, when pondering a problem, the bulk of the effort 
needs to be spent on formulating the problem (as clearly as possible). Due to a 
confluence of circumstances, cognitive science has been downplaying the role 
of understanding in cognitive performance. The main thrust in this chapter is to 
examine and elevate that role. The chapter is organized in fours parts. Section 2 
reviews challenges to understanding posed by different tasks, Section 3 starts with 
an excursion into evolutionary history, focusing on differences in cognitive perfor-
mance making human intelligence discontinuous with that of the other species, and 
Section 4 outlines a theory of understanding, building on the notions introduced in 
the preceding parts. Section 5 presents a discussion and brief concluding remarks.
2. Anatomy of understanding
Understanding involves grasping relations between entities, which boils down 
to fitting representations of these entities into simultaneous memory structures 
(mental models) that sharply reduce the number of degrees of freedom available 
to them. Illustrating how these processes operate in the understanding of literary 
works will help clarifying the ideas.
2.1 Understanding Shakespeare
The corpus of literary work by William Shakespeare includes 37 plays and over 
150 sonnets and poems. It has been estimated that a legion of monkeys with as 
many members as there are protons in the observable universe, each monkey having 
a typewriter and hitting randomly at the keys, would need the amount of time more 
than three hundred and sixty thousand orders of magnitude longer than the age of 
the universe in order to have a negligibly small chance (1 in 10500) of having typed a 
single play (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Infinite_monkey_theorem).
The adult human brain comprises 86 billion neurons and 85 billion non-neuronal 
cells [15] which are vanishingly small numbers compared to the size of the monkey 
legion. How is it possible that a vanishingly small number of cells in Shakespeare’s 
brain managed to produce his entire literary output within a vanishingly small 
time period (compared to the age of the universe)? The monkey legion is utterly 
disorganized while the activity of brain cells is precisely orchestrated, what are the 
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principles and mechanisms of such orchestration responsible for the staggering dif-
ference in the output? Taking a closer look at the construction of Shakespeare’s texts 
might offer some clues about the organization of brain processes.
Shakespeare’s complete works comprise 884,647 words arranged in 118, 406 lines. 
Applying statistical measures, one can find out, for example, that predictability of 
letters (entropy per letter) in Shakespeare’s texts depends strongly on the letter’s 
position in the word, declining from roughly 3.8 bits in the first letter to 2 bits in the 
second letter and reaching a plateau of 0.7 bits after the fifth letter. These statisti-
cal characteristics are not particularly informative since they do not change much 
when the words are randomly scrambled, nor there is much difference between 
Shakespeare’s text and a collection of mixed English texts from newspapers [16]. 
More sophisticated methods of text analysis apply measures of information-based 
energy and (information-based) temperature to detect variations in the text organi-
zation (words with different occurrence frequencies are placed at different energy 
levels presumed to obey Boltzmann distribution, and the relative temperature of a 
selected piece of text is computed as the ratio of energy measures in that piece and in 
the entire corpus). When applied to the collection of Shakespeare’s plays, the method 
revealed that, among the four genres (histories, comedies, tragedies and romances), 
tragedies have the highest relative temperature (histories have the lowest) and The 
Tragedy of Macbeth scores the highest among the tragedies [17]. How so?
Study in [17] interprets relative temperature as a characteristic of the author’s 
ability to choose words and construct texts in a manner that is both succinct and 
gives the fullest possible expression to the underlying thoughts (manifesting most 
prominently in Macbeth). Presumably, exercising this ability in the production of 
literary works (e.g., writing plays) is aimed at maximizing understandability, that 
is, affording readers the best means for understanding the author’s thoughts and 
intentions. Understandability can serve as a decisive criteria in assessing differ-
ences between Shakespeare’s texts and monkeys’ output: the overwhelming bulk 
of monkeys’ production is gibberish while Shakespeare’s works are understandable 
and profoundly meaningful.
Per Webster’s definition, text understandability depends on the extent to which 
the selection and composition of words are conducive to a) expressing relations 
considered by the author and b) constructing relations in the reader’s mind isomor-
phic to those entertained by the author. What is unique about Macbeth that could 
both make the play particularly understandable and also account for the results of 
statistical analysis? Consider three lines at the apex of the play (scene 23):
Seyton. The queen, my lord, is dead.
Macbeth. She should have died hereafter,
There would have been time for such a word…
The last two lines present the entirety of Macbeth’s reference to the queen in his 
response to the tragic news; made on the eve of the decisive battle, they convey, in 
the most succinct and powerful manner, the feeling of despair and a foreboding of 
the forthcoming military defeat. By wishing to shift the sad news to the “hereafter”, 
Macbeth assigns it a level of significance no lesser than that of the expected military 
rout and his own likely demise, thus conveying the feeling of a total catastrophe 
without making any verbose statements to that effect. The following observation 
concerns a feature of understanding capacity that is presumed to manifest promi-
nently in the cited text, and will play a pivotal role in the theory of understanding 
outlined in the subsequent sections. Observe that, when constructing the plot, 
Shakespeare was free to invoke the queens’ departure at any point, including 
allowing her to outlive her husband. The exact timing, neither a day earlier nor at 
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any time “hereafter”, must have been decided from the start precisely to motivate 
the striking expression of despair and the subsequent monolog which expanded the 
meaning of the play from a chronicle of particular (imaginary) events to a philo-
sophical generalization concerning the inescapable drama of the human condition. 
The monolog starts with the two lines above and concludes with some of the most 
quoted passages in Shakespeare’s literary legacy.
“Life’s but a walking shadow; a poor player
That struts and frets his hour upon the stage,
And then is heard no more: it is a tale
Told by an idiot, full of sound and fury,
Signifying nothing.”
The Tragedy of Macbeth involves 31 personages, including witches and appari-
tions, acting in small groupings in 25 consecutive scenes, as shown in Figure 1. The 
sparse matrix in Figure 1 reveals the overall organization of the play emanating 
from the organization of the author’s mental model that, presumably, formed at the 
conception of the play and controlled its unfolding.
To underscore, Figure 1 connotes that, in the mental model, interactions 
between personages are neither serial nor parallel but simultaneous (or “co-
instantaneously co-ordinated”, as termed by Jean Piaget in [18]). For example, in 
scene 3, witches prophesize to Macbeth which results in changing the state of his 
mind; in scene 7, Macbeth influenced by the prophecy kills Duncan, which was 
made possible by Duncan’s arrival in Macbeth’s castle in scene 6, etc. Macbeth’s 
monolog expresses Shakespeare’s pessimistic worldview that is echoed in his other 
plays, for example:
Prospero. “…Yea, all which is inherit, shall dissolve,
And like this unsubstantial pageant faded,
Leave not a rack behind, we are such stuff
As dreams are made of, and our little life
Is rounded with a sleep.” The Tempest, Act 4, scene 1
Arguably, the corpus of Shakespeare’s work, i.e. all 884,647 words in 118, 406 
lines, is a congruent expression of a worldview rendering all human affairs, except-
ing those serving the basic survival needs, both superfluous (see the epigraph to 
this chapter) and devoid of significance. It appears that exceptionally tight action 
coordination in the plot of Macbeth combined with succinct expressions of the 
Figure 1. 
Macbeth plot comprises tightly coordinated interactions among numerous personages and unfolds in consecutive 
scenes each involving a subset of personages.
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author’s worldview consistent with other such expressions throughout the corpus 
have surfaced in the text features detected by statistical measures [17].
To summarize what has been suggested up to this point: “apprehending general 
relations in a multitude of particulars” (per the definition in Webster’s Dictionary) 
takes the form of constructing simultaneous memory structures where entities and 
their behavior are tightly coordinated. “Relations” are different forms of behavior 
coordination, i.e., a particular manner in which changes in one entity entail changes 
in other entities. When entities admit multiple states and a variety of state transi-
tions, relations determine particular mappings between state transition sequences 
(state trajectories), as shown in Figure 2.
Models can form hierarchies where relations in the upper-level models (general 
relations) admit different instantiations in the lower levels (e.g., a worldview 
instantiated in different plays). Mental modeling enables predictions, explanations 
and planning under unfamiliar conditions, by ‘running’ models to generate predic-
tions and then using predictions to inform the responses. These functions are made 
possible by coordinations preventing combinatorial explosion that would have 
made them intractable. One more literary example (adopted from [19]) will help 
illustrating these important notions.
Two elderly gentlemen, A and B, are waiting together for a train when a present-
able looking young man (C) approaches A, politely asking for the time. After a 
short glance at C, A curtly tells C to leave them alone. When confronted by B about 
the rude response, A explains: “I thought that if I answered this young man, he 
might stay with us and keep the conversation going – next, he might board the train 
with us - next, he might get off the train with us – next, it might happen that my 
daughter D will come to meet me at the station – next, my daughter and the young 
man might like each other – next, they might start dating and will eventually marry 
– next, my daughter might end up unhappy because she married a man who can’t 
even buy himself a watch.”
Note that the model was a) composed on the spot to account for a peculiar set of 
circumstances (as opposed to being retrieved by matching or forged by filling slots 
in some pre-fabricated template), b) included a chain of tightly coordinated com-
ponents connecting current conditions to their likely remote consequences (the pre-
diction) and c) enabled using predictions to form a response deviating sharply from 
the habitual pattern (i.e., rude response to a polite question). More precisely, the 
model formed by A is a composition of globally coordinated and tightly constrained 
activities (e.g., C could choose any spot on the platform but was pinned down to the 
vicinity of A and B, he could board any train and get off anywhere but was con-
strained to follow A and B, daughter D could be doing anything anywhere but was 
constrained to appear at the railway station at the time of train’s arrival, etc.). The 
model instantiates a general relation (between income and matrimonial success) 
held by A, enabling him to predict events in the distant future (D will be unhappy) 
based on the current cue (C has no watch), and then to use this prediction to inform 
the immediate response and to explain the prediction and the response to B.
Figure 2. 
Relations establish coordinations between state trajectories. Models are simultaneous structures coordinating 
deployment of relations and self-initiated state changes (e.g., deploying relation “Macbeth kills Duncan” is 
preceded by Duncan’s decision to put himself in the harm’s way, by visiting Macbeth’s castle).
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Importantly, models admit deliberately inserted counterfactual variations (e.g. 
A could have second thoughts and imagine C owning an expensive watch and ask-
ing for time because it had accidentally stopped) and generate the corresponding 
predictions (e.g., a satisfactory marriage) without revisiting the path (i.e., skipping 
over the sequence “C will stay with us, board the train with us, etc.)). Similarly, 
the model allows assessing global impact of local changes in one of the components 
without giving consideration to other components (e.g., one does need to trace 
the chain of coordinations in order to realize that failure in one element (e.g., D 
does not come to the station) will fail the entire chain and cancel the prediction). 
Crucially, models ‘resist’ relaxation of constraints, requiring forceful (deliberate) 
insertion of variations (i.e., under the model, the thoughts of D failing to appear, 
or C owning an expensive watch, etc. do not come to mind, as opposed to being 
rejected upon examination).
To summarize, eliminating degrees of freedom in mental models entails remov-
ing from consideration an otherwise exploding multitude of alternatives, thus 
making predictions both attainable and usable (i.e., delivered within the time 
window demanded by the situation). Models admit local variations consistent 
across the model (e.g. Macbeth’s decision to kill Duncan in scene 7 is consistent with 
what happened to him in scene 2, etc.) and suppress spurious variations. As a result, 
understanding yields the experience of having succeeded in grasping “general 
relations in multitudes of particulars”, thus turning an intractable mess into a well 
ordered structure.
The next section turns from literary scenarios to realistic ones, seeking to 
illustrate the extremes (amazing successes and baffling failures) in the operation of 
understanding.
2.2 From children’s games to revolutionary discoveries
2.2.1 Baffling failures
Children at an early age often fail to connect and coordinate events taking place 
right in front of them, as follows. The child is shown a toy which is subsequently 
placed under a cover allowing her to retrieve the toy. After a few successful repeti-
tions, the toy is transferred, in full view of the child, to another spot where it is 
placed under another cover. After some hesitation, the child looks for the toy, not in 
the spot to where it was just moved but in the previous one [20].
Claudius Galen, an outstanding philosopher and physician in the Roman 
Empire, formulated a theory of blood production and processing in the body (circa 
150 AD). The theory asserted that blood is produced in the liver from ingested food, 
rises to the lungs through the right side of the heart, crosses through pores to the left 
side where it is mixed with inhaled air and, finally, gets distributed throughout the 
body and consumed by the tissue (the surplus is expelled with sweat and urine). In 
this schema, heart remains a reservoir where blood is collected and treated (mixed 
with air) on its way from the source (liver) to the sink (tissues). In the XIth century, 
Galen’s works were translated into Latin and became a dogma that dominated 
medical profession for over 500 years. Ironically, bloodletting was one of the most 
frequent treatment modalities in the medieval medicine, but neither the viewing of 
blood streams spurting from incisions nor the evidence of heart’s incessant beating 
in one’s own chest could cause questioning of the dogma. In 1628, English physician 
William Harvey published a book presenting a simple and cogently argued model of 
blood circulation. Moreover, he pointed out absurdities inherent in the dogma (e.g., 
the liver would have to produce several times the body weight in blood every day if 
the blood was being absorbed). Despite their undeniable strength (a simple model 
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accounting fully of the available data and revealing critical shortcomings in the 
earlier account), Harvey’s ideas were met with ridicule [21, 22]. The medical profes-
sion was unable to overcome the inertia and re-structure the entrenched model, 
thus failing to apprehend coordination between a few vital variables. Galen was an 
expert on pulse diagnosis and published a treaties on the subject, which makes his 
conceptual blind spots particularly baffling. Perpetuation of Galen’s model would 
have arrested progress in medicine, causing incalculable losses (think of Galenic 
cardiology).
2.2.2 Spectacular successes
In the 1820–1835 time period, Michael Faraday formulated key ideas of the field 
theory postulating relations between electric and magnetic phenomena which, 
in the preceding decades, were commonly viewed as being totally unrelated. 
Expressed in a mathematical formalism by James Clerk Maxwell, the Faraday - 
Maxwell model of electromagnetism depicted propagation of electric and magnetic 
fields as tightly coordinated processes. Faraday’s conceptualization of fields envi-
sioned material entities of a kind that are not perceptually accessible but permeate 
space and carry force. In a brilliant feat of expansive insight, Maxwell realized the 
existence of relations between electromagnetic waves, light and perception of color. 
These findings have been propelling advances in physics and technology, until the 
present day and into the foreseeable future.
Modern physics (quantum mechanics, astrophysics) deals with entities that are 
not directly observable. Literature reports that key ideas concerning quantum pro-
cesses were formulated by Werner Heisenberg (circa 1925) following an insight he 
allegedly received when taking a walk in the park at night and observing a passer by 
appearing in illuminated areas under lamp posts and disappearing in the shadows 
when leaving those areas [23]. The position and movement of the person between 
the posts remained undetermined, suggesting the idea of indeterminate states of 
electrons in the atom when transiting between energy levels (somewhat similar to 
indeterminate states of characters in a play when transiting between scenes, as in 
Figure 1). Quantum mechanics proved to be the most successful physical theory 
ever formulated, predicting the outcomes of particle interactions with unparalleled 
accuracy.
As reported in [24], an explosion on a DC-10 passenger airliner incapacitated 
one of three engines and demolished the hydraulic system, causing loss of control 
mechanisms for the remaining two engines except for their thrust levers. Hydraulic 
systems are built with triple redundancy, bringing the odds of losing control due to 
hydraulic system failure to less than one in a billion. Accordingly, no protocol has 
been ever created for handling such occasions and no training was ever offered. 
When the aircraft started pitching violently up and down (a phugoid pattern), the 
pilot had a short time window to figure out how to suppress phugoids and land the 
aircraft. According to pilot’s recollections, a simplified model was formed in his 
mind that accounted for the location of the remaining two engines and suggested 
a maneuvering strategy using differential thrust. The strategy was not only unfa-
miliar but grossly counterintuitive, requiring decelerating when the aircraft was 
climbing and accelerating when it was heading down. When flight conditions were 
reproduced in a simulator, numerous pilots failed to figuring out a course of action 
and kept crashing (could not make the runway after dozens of attempts) [24].
Samuel Reschevsky, a chess prodigy born in 1911 in Poland, learned the game at 
the age of four and at the age of eight was defeating champions of his country in 
tournaments, as well as beating scores of opponents, including master-level players, 
in public demonstrations of simultaneous play. Although cognitive difficulties faced 
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in chess have been always appreciated, there were no satisfactory methods for 
quantifying them until the era of chess computers. Chess algorithms required 
hardware with operating speed at or above 810  position evaluations per second in 
order to compete with expert players capable of carrying out at most one or two 
position evaluations per second. Understanding the game compensates for the 1: 
810  disadvantage in speed: expert players perceive configurations of pieces as 
compositions of “complexes”, deriving game plans from apprehending coordina-
tions between the “complexes” [25]. Findings in [25] suggest that expert game 
models take the form of simultaneous structures, not unlike the matrix in Figure 1. 
A novice’s perception is limited to a few adjacent cells in the matrix (2–3 moves 
look-ahead involving 2–3 pieces) while expert models can include a hierarchy of 
matrices encompassing the entire configuration and extending to 10–15 moves 
look-ahead Position analysis involves envisioning variations for some of the moves, 
constrained by the entire web of coordinations across the matrix. As a result, 
experts are not distracted into considering spurious (weak) moves, no more than 
novices waste effort in considering illegal moves [26].
To summarize, the previous section associated understanding with the devel-
opment of mental models representing entities, their behavior and different forms 
of behavior coordination in the form of simultaneous memory structures. It was 
suggested that simultaneous coordination suppresses combinatorial explosion, 
confining the process to an infinitesimally small volume in the vast combinatorial 
space (considering possible move combinations in chess, similar to considering 
possible letter combinations in playwriting, quickly brings one to the realm of 
counting protons in multiple universes). Prediction, explanation and planning are 
enabled by mental modeling. This section reviewed extreme cases when model-
ing processes failed to establish coordination between a few directly observable 
and persistent entities and succeeded in quickly coordinating multiple, transient 
and/or unobservable ones. Summarily, suggestions and observations in Section 2 
define the main challenges facing a theory of understanding:
a. what neuronal mechanisms can account for the successes and shortcomings of 
the understanding capacity,
b. how such mechanisms could emerge and
c. how could they develop in the human species within the time period of 
negligible duration (on the evolutionary time scale).
The next part focuses on the emergence of understanding.
3. A brief history of understanding
Notions addressed in this part were developed elsewhere [10–13, 27–30] and 
will be summarized briefly here. A preview will help putting the notions together: 
Environment is in flux, survival depends on an organism’s ability to adapt to the 
changing environment. Adaptation makes the world livable while understand-
ing makes it intelligible, that is, amenable to prediction and explanation (i.e., 
connecting likely future events to their plausible causes in the past and present). 
Mechanisms of understanding complete the transformation of sensory streams into 
world models that generate such predictions and explanations. The transformation 
starts with mechanisms of sensation and perception that are available, in different 
forms, in other species, and culminates in the mechanism of understanding unique 
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to humans. Learning response-reward (response-punishment) patterns increases 
reward chances and decreases punishment risks when conditions recur. A reper-
toire of such learned patterns constitutes a model of the environment instantiated 
by pattern matching. Understanding is an advanced adaptive mechanism serving 
to overcome the inertia of prior learning and optimize responses when conditions 
are novel or violate the previously acquired conditions-response associations in 
a consequential manner (e.g., learned responses cease to be rewarding) [10–13]. 
This characterization is consistent with definitions of intelligence in the literature 
(“fluid intelligence” [18, 31–33]) establishing understanding capacity as the central, 
defining feature of human intellect.
3.1 Evolutionary precursors
Complex life forms have been developing on Earth at an accelerating pace: 
From the emergence of unicellular organisms some 3.7 billion years ago, to (the 
emergence of) multicellular animals 900 million years ago, to vertebrate 530 
million years ago, to primates about 70 million years ago, to the detachment of the 
human branch from the chimpanzee/bonobos primate branch 6 million years ago 
to, finally, the emergence of anatomically modern Sapiens [34] at the time period 
of 200,000–100,000 years ago (the emergence of language is attributed to the time 
period of roughly 150,000–60,000 years ago [35–37].
Recent findings indicated genealogical continuity in Sapience in the last 
28,000 years, i.e. from Upper Paleolithic to modern times [38]. During the same 
period, the size of the braincase has been decreasing, having lost more than 10% 
of its peak value [39]), after a preceding period of about 6 million years during 
which the size almost tripled [40]. Recent analysis comparing the results of electro-
physiological, anatomical and fMRI studies in humans and non-human primates 
associated development of intelligence primarily with reorganization of brain 
mechanisms [41]. These findings seem to indicate that reorganizations entailed 
higher efficiency so that progressively more complex tasks could be carried out 
Figure 3. 
Gap X denotes discontinuity in the development of cognitive capacities. Simple organisms interact with 
substances located on their ‘blankets’, more complex organisms can move towards and reach for target objects 
(denoted by black circles) in close proximity to their blankets (e.g. salamanders shoot their tongues to catch 
insects), and advanced animals (apes, some avians) can use a few supplementary objects (denoted by shaded 
and white circles) to act on the target (e.g. chimpanzees can connect sticks and pile up boxes in order to reach 
a hanging fruit). Humans are discontinuous with the other species in that they can form coordinated structures 
(designs) comprising indefinitely large sets of supplementary objects giving access to indefinitely distant 
targets, with the possibility of postponing acting on such targets until some indefinitely remote future moments 
(anticipatory planning).
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without increasing the size of the neuronal pool. Section 4 will suggest the type of 
reorganization that could produce such revolutionary improvements.
Comparing modes of interaction between the organism and environment across 
the spectrum of life forms reveals discontinuities between Sapiens and other spe-
cies, as shown in Figure 3. The term ‘Markov blanket’ [13, 14] denotes an enclosing 
boundary (e.g., membrane) separating organism from the environment (the notion 
will be defined more precisely in the next section).
Differences between Sapience and other species are qualitative: they lie not in 
the increased quantity of supplementary objects but in the drive to keep extend-
ing the reach of action (action envelope) and to form progressively more complex 
designs comprising growing numbers of objects of increasing variety. Stated 
differently, animal envelopes are limited to the immediate proximity of their 
Markov blankets while human envelopes undergo indefinite expansion. Amplifying 
Shakespeare’s insight (expressed succinctly in the epigraph), it can be suggested 
that animals seek biological equilibrium with their environment (i.e., maintaining 
inflows of energy and nutrients at life-sustaining levels) while humans seek cogni-
tive equilibrium entailing demands not reducible to those associated with sustaining 
life. Hence, gap X. What is the nature of that gap?
3.1.1 Learning and pattern recognition
Consider challenges facing organisms in a changing environment. Assume first 
that the varying flow of conditions (stimuli) includes some recurring patterns. 
Since finding successful responses consumes time and effort, recognizing such pat-
terns and re-using the responses saves both. The strategy works best when patterns 
comprise a few contiguous stimuli that trigger a small repertoire of fixed responses. 
However, even this simple strategy working under favorable circumstances can 
become self-defeating when the circumstance change, as illustrated in the following 
example.
Salamanders shoot their tongues at objects (insects) whose size, speed and dis-
tance from the animal fall within some fixed ranges, which requires anticipatory 
response control (early activation of the projector muscle relative to the tongue 
launch) to improve the chances of successful intercepts. The shooting mechanism 
was fine-tuned by evolution (developing spring-loaded type of tongue ejection 
yielding high energy output), making the animal a successful predator [42]. 
Consider a hypothetical scenario when the advantages are turned into detriments. 
The shooting mechanism is thermally sensitive: the speed of tongue retraction 
increases with temperature [42] which can be used, potentially, to increase the 
amount of prey intake per unit time. Assume that the animal can learn the ‘higher 
temperature – higher intake’ association, compelling it to seek high temperature 
spots. Such learning will keep paying off for as long as the prey cooperates: if the 
insects start moving faster in the vicinity of hot spots (or avoid them, etc.), the 
intercept success rate will decline. However, the animal will be bound to continue 
the heat-seeking behavior until the association decays, which might cause it to die 
from hunger and/or exhaustion (missing targets decreases food intake but not the 
costs). The point is that the ability to suppress learned behavior can yield quantum 
leap improvements in adaptive robustness, by reducing the probability of ‘blind 
persistence’ types of error inherent in recognition-centered strategy, and/or reduc-
ing the severity of the consequences. In general, the strategy works if short con-
tiguous patterns (compact patterns) recur with frequency sufficient for satisfying 
the organism’s survival needs. Assume that the requirement is not met, forcing the 
animal to seek strategies applicable in more complex stimuli configurations.
11
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3.1.2 Gap X
Removing (or relaxing) the contiguity requirement changes an animal’s view of 
the environment: form a noisy stream of compact patterns to a stream of uncertain 
structure where patterns can no longer be readily discerned. Stated differently, in 
streams of non-contiguous patterns (dispersed patterns) stimuli groupings in one 
pattern can be interspersed irregularly with groupings belonging to other patterns, 
thus allowing extending patterns over indefinitely long stimuli sequences and time 
periods. Dispersed patterns place organisms at the horns of a dilemma, as shown 
below.
Pattern composition in Figure 4(2) is inherently uncertain, gradual reduction 
of the uncertainty proceeds reversibly through the stages of a) defining entities 
(as compositions of states), b) defining behaviors (as patterns of state transition) 
c) defining relations (as forms of behavior coordination), resulting in the con-
struction of simultaneous structures representing interactions between entities in 
successions of episodes, as shown in Figure 5.
Strategies in Figure 4(1) and (2) reside at the opposite sides of gap X: cogni-
tive operations underlying the former are exogenously driven, i.e., triggered 
by the environment and carried out under feedback control, while operations 
underlying the latter are endogenously-driven, i.e. decoupled from the sensory 
inflows. Rudimentary forms of such decoupling manifest in animal behavior, e.g., 
dogs following a prey that disappears behind an obstacle might not chase it around 
the corner but run to intercept at the opposite corner. On the human side of the 
gap, reversible operations become available gradually as the person matures, 
causing characteristic errors (e.g., young children fail in the “toy has moved” task 
requiring that association (toy, cover1, spot1) is followed by dissociation (toy, 
cover1, spot1) ➔ (cover 1, spot 1) ➔ (toy, cover2, spot2), see section I.2.a. A 
different form of dissociation deficit manifests in older children when they fail to 
dissociate container from the contents: a child watching liquid being poured from 
one container to another can believe that the amount changes with the size of the 
container [43].
Note that entity construction principles in Figure 4(2) and 5 express an implicit 
assumption that entity’s identity can be preserved in different manifestations in 
non-contiguous episodes, that is, the same entity can have different (non-overlap-
ping) manifestations and, vice versa, different entities can have identical manifesta-
tions (e.g., in Greek mythology, enterprising Zeus was appearing to mortal women 
in the form of a swan, a bull, or even a shower. On one occasion, Zeus presented 
himself to a lady in a form that was identical to her husband (Amphitryon) in every 
Figure 4. 
Transition from compact to dispersed patterns inside gap X. 1) contiguous stimuli grouping ABC recurs at 
irregular noisy intervals, response strategy consists in finding activities rewarded by ABC and emitting them 
whenever the pattern is recognized. 2) removing the contiguity requirement changes the strategy from pattern 
recognition to pattern construction. Here is the dilemma: stimuli A, B, C can be manifestations of either 
different entities requiring different responses or different states of the same entity requiring the same response 
(possibly, with modifications). Whatever the resolution, it might change at some later point in time, e.g. XYB 
and XYC can be determined to be the states of some entity Z, causing a to recede into the background noise, etc.
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detail but was not her husband – Amphitryon was quite sure of that). Implicit 
explorations of logic in Greek mythology were made explicit by Aristotle in the 
Laws of Thought, including the Law of Identity.
3.2 Crossing gap X
According to an appealing hypothesis [44], the earliest steps in the expansion 
of the human envelope were associated with predation by throwing projectiles 
(stones). Accurate aiming requires precise coordination of several variables 
including launch angle, velocity, weight and size of the stone, distance to the prey 
and its size, and release time, with the width of the release time window limited to 
a few milliseconds (e.g., 11 milliseconds for a rabbit-size stationary target located 
4 meters away, these results will be re-visited in the next section). Analysis based 
on experimental findings (narrowing the time window involves synchronization 
in neuronal clusters of growing size) demonstrated that increasing distance to 
targets while maintaining the hit rate requires explosive growth in the number 
of neurons responsible for precise timing (64-fold and 729-fold increase in the 
number of neurons to double and triple the distance, correspondingly).
Anatomical limitations imposed on the volume of cranial cavity appeared to 
exclude the possibility that a growing variety of high-precision activities (e.g. split-
ting stones for different tasks) could be obtained by developing narrowly special-
ized neuronal modules. Anatomical limitations enforce other trade-offs having 
impact on cognitive performance, e.g., increasing the speed of pulse conduction 
would require increasing the thickness of myelin wrappings, which would decrease 
the number of neurons the cranial geometry can accommodate [40, 44] .
In addition to constraints in brain size and conduction speed, another physical 
factor having decisive impact on brain processes is limited supply of energy for 
powering them. Since physical constraints on brain processes are non-negotiable, 
the only avenue for obtaining quantum advancements in cognitive performance 
depicted in Figure 2 appears to be dynamic optimization in their deployment, 
which boils down to global coordination via the mechanisms of mental modeling. 
Figure 5. 
An irreversible stimuli stream is transformed into a simultaneous record, cycles of reversible operations on the 
record (select/deselect, etc.) produce simultaneous structures comprising various entities interacting in series of 
episodes (see Figure 1).
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These notions will be addressed in the theory of understanding in the next part, 
following another example of mental modeling in the closing of this part.
For the sake of argument, assume that advancing the predation-by-throwing-
projectiles strategy involved invention of catapults, in the simplest form of a board 
(B1) balanced on a base, or fulcrum (B2). Note that neither component, if considered 
individually, betrays any hint as to its potential usefulness for projectile throwing. 
Moreover, when considered jointly, these components afford numerous arrange-
ments that are all useless (e.g., the base on top of the board, etc.), with only one 
particular form of base-board position coordination yielding the benefit. Operations 
involved in constructing and operating catapults are suggested in Figure 6.
Note that the product of modeling is a new entity (a weapon) that has properties 
unavailable in the components and expands the activity envelope (larger distances, 
heavier projectiles). Running the model yields understanding, i.e., informs opera-
tion and aiming procedures. For example, envisioning one side of the board going 
up brings to mind the image of the other side going down, envisioning increasing 
the distance to the target brings to mind the image of increasing the length of 
the shoulder (shifting the projectile away from the base), etc. That same process 
underlies prediction (e.g. hit probability) and explanation (why hitting that target 
over there is unlikely?).
It is interesting to note that children up to a certain age, when learning to operate 
toy catapults, are often incapable of forming proper models and keep shifting 
projectiles in the direction of the target as it moves away (shortening the shoulder), 
even after having watched the proper operation multiple times [43]. The instinctual 
tendency to grasp receding objects by extending arms and moving after the objects 
resists learning. Young children cannot understand catapults.
Recent theories concerning the origins of language placed the capacity to 
perform reversible juxtaposition (operation Merge) at the foundation on which all 
other language mechanisms have been built (B2 B1) ➔ C (operation Merge com-
bines syntactic objects in an arbitrary order [45]).
To summarize, this part defined understanding as an advanced adaptive mecha-
nism that makes possible constructing responses to indefinitely large patterns 
comprised of non-contiguous stimuli groupings (dispersed patterns). Construction 
proceeds through identifying entities, their properties and behavior and the forms 
of inter-entity behavior coordination, culminating in the production of simultane-
ous, tightly coordinated structures comprising multiple entities (mental models). 
Models are amenable to manipulations, giving rise to the dual capacity for predict-
ing likely events (changes in the entities) and identifying their causes in the past or 
present (explanations). In general, any organism can be viewed as a cast molded by 
the environmental niche it occupies, e.g., salamander is a ‘cast mold’ of environment 
where particular (edible) insects having size and speed within some fixed ranges 
are flowing into a volume in space reachable by the animal in unit time in quantities 
sufficient for the animal’s survival. The total model includes biophysical component 
Figure 6. 
Modeling starts with selecting entities (objects) and juxtaposing them as separate (independent) entities, 
followed by associating them in a composite structure allowing inter-dependence, followed by coordinating 
the entities to form a model (note that juxtaposition brings components together in an arbitrary order 
while association imposes order, setting the stage for establishing a higher degree of order in the model). 
Symbol ⋈ denotes coordination.
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(body and the sensory-motor periphery, e.g. the tongue-ejecting mechanism) and 
regulatory component orchestrating activities within the body and at the periphery 
(i.e., animal’s behavior in the environment). Both components undergo evolution-
ary development in the species while behavior regulation is amenable to adaptive 
changes in individuals during their lifetime (learning). In animals, learning is 
restricted to condition-driven variations within narrow envelopes of genetically-
fixed condition-response patterns and propensities. Condition-driven learning 
extrapolates from past precedents while mental modeling enables prediction and 
response construction under conditions having no such precedents. More precisely, 
models integrate past history within cross-coordinated structures so predictions 
produced by operations on the structure can be made consistent with (plausible 
under the entire past history) without repeating any of its elements. Moreover, 
models allow reproductive construction without replication, e.g., coordinations in 
the basic catapult were reproduced in numerous designs.
As observed by Jean Piaget [46].
“…mental coordinations succeed in combining all the multifarious data and succes-
sive data into an overall, simultaneous picture, which vastly multiplies their powers 
of spatio-temporal extension, and of deducing possible developments”  
([46] p. 218).
Summarily, it has been suggested that a) the protohuman-to-human transition 
was associated with the emergent capacity to construct responses to dispersed 
stimuli patterns and b) the capacity is rooted in the mechanisms of mental model-
ing that represents such patterns as coordinated structures that suppress combi-
natorial explosion inherent in the construction process and reduce the number of 
response compositions to a few plausible alternatives.
4. Theory of understanding: neuronal mechanisms of mental modeling
The theory in a nutshell: Nervous system optimizes deployment of sensory-
motor resources vis-à-vis varying external conditions, a part of the system that 
coordinates variations in the deployment of sensory motor-resources with varia-
tions in the conditions flow constitutes the first regulatory loop. Mechanisms of 
understanding operate on top of the first loop and optimize the organization of 
neuronal resources engaged in that loop, thus forming the second regulatory loop. 
Optimization in the second loop involves arranging neurons into coordinated struc-
tures manifested in coordinated mental models, as shown in Figure 4. Operations 
in the first loop are controlled by sensory-motor feedback while operations in the 
second one are decoupled from it. Feedback control makes resource deployment 
adaptive, self-controlled optimization in the second loop makes it self-adaptive [11]. 
First and second loops are stages of self-organization in the neuronal substrate. The 
first loop allows adaptation to compact sensory patterns extending over short time 
periods while the second one expands adaptation to dispersed patterns extending 
over indefinitely large time periods (prediction). limitations on the size of the neu-
ronal pool and the amount of usable energy supplied per unit time drive the need 
to increase adaptation span while reducing energy costs, which boils down to a dual 
optimization criteria: minimize energy losses and the amount of energy consuming 
activities while maximizing prediction accuracy. Both criteria are subsumed under 
the notion of active inference [13, 14, 47].
This part will discuss the role of understanding capacity within the active infer-
ence framework, followed by detailed suggestions regarding neuronal mechanisms 
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that underlie the capacity and are responsible for the range of its operation, includ-
ing the extremes. The part concludes by referencing experimental findings and 
ideas in the literature that might help in assessing biological plausibility of the 
present proposal.
4.1 Active inference: from Aristotle to Friston
The opening line in Aristotle’s Metaphysics states that “humans desire to under-
stand” [48]. Lack of understanding engenders puzzlement, and failure to identify 
causes leads to undesirable self-evaluation
“.. men of experience know that thing is so, but do not know why, while the others 
know the ‘why’ and the cause…. and man who is puzzled and wonders thinks 
himself ignorant” (Aristotle, Metaphysics).
In a penetrating insight, Aristotle captures relations between experiences, 
surprise (puzzlement) and self-directed activities motivated by the desire to reach 
beyond the appearances (identify causes). Arguably, principles of active inference 
and variational free energy minimization advanced in [13] are congruent with 
those early insights. The principles assert that life in all its forms, from unicellular 
organisms to humans, is predicated on the organisms ability to use sensing to 
predict conditions in its environment and to conduct activities reducing the differ-
ence between the predicted and the actual experiences. Predictions require models 
of the environment, the variational free energy value determines, roughly, the 
(information-theoretic) distance between the current and the desired states that 
takes into account the difference between the predicted conditions and those that 
were actually sensed and the surprise experienced under the model (the smaller the 
probability assigned by the model to the condition, the higher the surprise).
Emphasis on activities directed at minimizing variational free energy underlies 
the notion of ‘active inference,’ which is best appreciated if contrasted to the idea of 
‘passive’ inference expressed in Plato’s allegory of the cave, as follows. Prisoners are 
chained to the floor inside a cave where they can see nothing of the outside world 
except shadows on the wall they are facing. The message is that people are caged 
inside their minds, senses are the only window into the world, and that window can 
be distorting. The allegory defines passive inference: prisoners can make guesses 
about the outside world but have no means to validate them or to use in any fashion.
Active inference differs from passive inference in that it incorporates iterative 
actions on both the outside world and the model of that world that can lead to 
progressively improving guesses. Understanding involves a form of model manipu-
lation that is best defined within the active inference theory through the notion of 
a Markov Blanket - the third conceptual pillar in the theory integrating ideas about 
emergence of life, evolution, and brain operation into a seamless whole.
‘Markov Blanket of node x’ is a graph-theoretic term denoting a set of nodes 
in a directed graph that are connected to x by links incident to and from x. More 
loosely, the term can be used to denote a group of nodes in subnetwork X1 separat-
ing it from the rest of the network X. If links denote some form of interaction, 
Markov Blanket of X1 can be viewed as an interface through which internal nodes 
in X1 interact with their surrounds in X. On that view, Markov Blanket accords X1 
a degree of (conditional) independence from X - a critical concept in the overall 
theory, as follows.
The theory of life attributes emergence of life to spontaneous phase transitions 
in molecular networks (‘primordial soup’), resulting in the formation of subnet-
works that remain connected to their surrounds but acquire a degree statistical 
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independence (autonomy) from it. In that context, Markov Blanket denotes interface 
(a ‘membrane’) between such quasi-autonomous formations and their environment 
[14]. As more complex forms of life develop, the Markov Blanket expands to incor-
porate the entire sensory-motor periphery, as suggested in Figure 3. Finally, Figure 7 
separates Markov Blanket from the nervous system to illustrate the notions of active 
inference and comprehensive active inference (incorporating the understanding 
capacity).
The process in Figure 7A is an idealization; Figure 7B depicts associative learn-
ing (e.g. the hypothetical salamander associates elevated temperature with success-
ful hunting, entailing search for hot spots); Figure 7C depicts active construction 
of mental models that underlies understanding. Learning yields “knowledge that a 
thing is so”, understanding defines causes.
In summary, different facets of the ideas depicted in Figure 7 have been 
addressed in numerous sources in psychology, physiology, neuroscience and 
philosophy of the mind. The active inference framework offers a synthesis of 
some of the key insights in these disciplines, integrating them in a coordinated 
conceptual structure expressed in a unifying mathematical formalism. The 
central notion is that of activity: an organism is actively seeking sensory inputs, 
constructs models and acts on the environment. These contentions will be re-
visited in the discussion.
4.2 Neuronal mechanisms
The proposal in this section stems from five assumptions about the nature of 
neuronal processes that underlie intelligence and its special form, understand-
ing. The proposal will be presented in three sections: first, the assumptions are 
formulated, along with some clarifications; next, the key points in the theory are 
formulated and applied to answer questions posed at the end of Section 2; finally, 
these key points are re-visited and related to experimental findings and other ideas 
in the literature.
Figure 7. 
Passive inference, active inference and comprehensive active inference. (A) The allegory of the cave (passive 
observation without action: sensory input is neither solicited nor acted upon. (B) Observation-action iterations 
guided by feedback produce (deposit) a model that adjusts subsequent iterations and gets adjusted by them. 
(C) Second regulatory loop manipulates structures formed by the first loop to construct models, the process is 
decoupled from the motor-sensory feedback.
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4.2.1 Assumptions
4.2.1.1 Cognition involves active deployment of neuronal resources
Brain is a synergistic system that selects, mobilizes and deploys (fires) neurons. 
Mobilization involves activities that precede firing and are centered on tuning, as 
shown Figure 8.
Consider the following three experiments: raising your right hand and touching 
your nose with the index finger, doing the same with your eyes closed, and imagin-
ing the same without doing anything. The first run involves coordination in the 
external space, the second involves coordination in the mental space (you know 
where your nose and your finger are, without reference to external coordinates), the 
third demonstrates coordination in the neuronal space that underlies the other two 
(I shall return to these exciting experiments at the end of the section).
4.2.1.2 Progressively improving deployment requires relative stability of neuronal 
groups
Deployment strategy progresses from deploying individual neurons to deploy-
ing neuronal groups, to deploying groups of groups, etc., which requires a degree of 
stability in all the elements of the growing organization. This intuition entailed the 
notion of “neuronal packets” that is pivotal in the theory.
A neuronal packet is Hebb’s assembly (i.e., comprises neurons connected by 
associative links) that is synergistic and is separated by a boundary energy barrier 
from the surrounding associative network.
It was hypothesized that packets form as a result of phase transition in associative 
networks, not unlike raindrops form in vapor. Accordingly, energy barrier is deter-
mined by surface tension, that is, the amount of free energy per unit surface (pre-
sumably, surface comprises cell membranes in the boundary neurons. Accordingly, 
surface energy is determined by the distribution of membrane potential across the 
surface). Neurons at the packet boundary constitute packet’s Markov Blanket, surface 
tension in the boundary holds neurons together. Mapping these notions on the 
process in Figure 4 will help appreciating its crucial consequences: first, combining 
neurons responding to A, B, C, D, E… in a quasi-stable bounded packet amounts to 
asserting existence (perceiving) some bounded entity (object) α  comprising 
features α = {A, B, C, D, E…} and, second, synergistic packets allow ‘tuning’ to their 
Figure 8. 
Neurons ix  and jx  are selected in the neuronal pool and tuned to stimulus C in the stimuli stream. Neuron ix
responds to A, B, C stimuli, tuning amplifies its response to C. Sensing and motor actions are both products of 
active deployment (e.g. one sees color C because some neurons were selected, mobilized and tuned to C). 
Imagining color C involves the same process. Imagining A, or B, or C involves shifts in tuning, which can be 
expressed as rotating neuron’s response vector. Co-firing of ix  and jx  establishes an associative link between 
them.
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individual constituents (rotating packet vector) which is experienced as envisioning 
different states, or facets of object α (e.g., rotating the image). Energy barriers 
‘anchor’ determinations in Figure 4, e.g., once feature A has been attributed to 
objectα , the barriers will resist (require energy investment in) separating A from α . 
As a result, barriers serve the dual function of binding neurons together in stable 
groups and binding those groups to ‘objects.’ Figure 9 illustrates these notions.
4.2.1.3 Improving deployment requires coordination of neuronal groups
Models are composite ‘objects,’ i.e., synergistic groups of coordinated packets. For 
example, neuronal group ‘catapult’ comprises packets ‘board’, ‘base’, ‘projectile’ and 
‘target’ and can be ‘tuned’ to different states of the composite object. A crucial point: 
feature space of ‘catapult’ has dimensionality higher than that of the constituents, 
rotating the ‘catapult’ vector (e. g, switching between states ‘unloaded’➔ ‘loaded’ ➔ 
‘aimed’, etc.) reflects coordinated movement of the constituent vectors (e.g., envi-
sioning a receding target brings to mind the image of a projectile moving away from 
the base). Figure 10 maps these notions on the organization depicted in Figure 7c.
4.2.1.4 Brain is a self-organizing virtual system
Genetically-defined propensities in the brain substrate (gray and white mat-
ter, etc.) allow a range of self-organization trajectories, the actual developmental 
Figure 9. 
1. Successive co-activation of different neurons produces a growing associative network. 2. Associative network 
undergoes phase transition resulting in the formation of packet iX , giving rise to perceiving objectα . Different 
activation–inhibition patterns inα underlie the experience ofα manifesting states β and γ and behavior 
patterns) β ➔ γ and γ ➔ β .
Figure 10. 
Phase transitions in the associative network transform it into a packet network. Selecting, mobilizing and 
deploying packets in the packet network populates the world with a multitude of distinct objects capable of 
different behavior patterns. Mental models establish coordination between behavior patterns.
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trajectory results from an interplay between the propensities and conditions 
encountered throughout the lifetime.
4.2.1.5 Brain is an energy seeking system
Self-organization is predicated on energy inflows sufficient for producing 
coordinated neuronal structures. The process is sustainable because it stabilizes 
energy inflows via expanding the range of extremal activities (thus diversifying 
energy sources) while minimizing internal energy expenditures incurred in the 
expansion.
4.2.1.6 Self-organization proceeds through assimilation/accommodation cycles
Periods of deliberate (attentive, self-directed) construction and manipulation 
of mental models alternate with periods of spontaneous re-structuring: the overall 
neuronal organization adapts to the newly formed structures and, reciprocally, the 
new structure are adjusted and integrated into the organization.
4.2.1.7 Brain is a synergistic system
In neuronal structures, a few controls can manipulate a much larger numbers of 
degrees of freedom [49, 50]. Figure 11 illustrates this important notion.
4.2.2  Putting it all together: neuronal substrate of understanding and brain 
functional architecture
Assumptions advanced in the preceding section entail the following suggestions.
1. Formation of neuronal packets transforms associative network into a packet 
network embedded into an energy landscape, with the packets residing in local 
minima. The height of packet energy barrier mE  (free energy) is a function of 
temperature T and parameter ( )Tσ  reflecting cumulative strength of 
 associative links incident to the packet’s Markov Blanket (MB) from inside the 
packet vs. the cumulative strength of those incident from the outside.
 ( ) ( )mE T T d T dTσ σ= − /  
Figure 11. 
Imagine raising your arm and touching the tip of your nose in three consecutive positions: looking to the left, 
looking straight ahead, and looking to the right. Population vector in the packet determining arm movement 
rotates accordingly. Coordinates of the nose tip in mental space control tuning of numerous neurons in the arm 
packet. Seminal studies in [51–53] demonstrated that movement organization involves rotation of packet vectors 
in the direction of the target.
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 ( ( )Tσ  is analogous to membrane potential determined by the difference in 
ions concentration on both sides of the membrane, ( )Tσ  declines as tempera-
ture grows, mE  is an inverse of MB’s permeability (resistance)). Packets 
connected by associative links might not be mutually accessible if separated by 
high energy barriers, as illustrated in Figure 12.
 The height of energy barrier mE  determines relative stability of packet mX  that 
corresponds, roughly, to a level of subjective confidence in mX , which can vary 
depending on the local temperature (the lower the temperature, the higher the 
barrier. Consistent with [54], temperature variations shape the landscape and 
facilitate jumps of free energy barriers. Under the notion that deployment of 
neuronal resources serves to extract free energy from the environment [11, 12]
temperate can be viewed as a control parameter regulating access to intra-packet 
resources, which equates temperature inverse to a cost, in entropy, of the free 
energy reward  from the outside [54] received by the system as a result of the 
packet’s deployment). The subjective experience of local temperature corre-
sponds, roughly, to a level of arousal associated with object mα . As a result, 
circumstances are possible when packets having low evidential support (low 
cumulative strength of internal associations) remain stable, separate from other 
packets and inaccessible to coordination with them.
2. Variations in the mode of energy delivery (level of arousal, sustained and fo-
cused attention vs. wandering and diffuse attention) cause deformations in the 
landscape and enable overcoming energy barriers. Figure 13 illustrates these 
notions.
 Maintaining focused attention underlies the experience of cognitive effort that 
accompanies recall or attempts to ascertain connections between some entities 
(e.g., objects represented by packets iX  and )kX . The experience was best 
described in [56], as shown in Figure 14.
3. Mental models are synergistic neuronal complexes that comprise packets, 
regulatory neuronal structures that coordinate rotation of packet vectors, and 
Figure 12. 
Here, q denotes a coordinate in the packet network space packets mX  and iX  are adjacent in the network but 
are not mutually accessible due to a high energy barrier that separates them. By contrast, packets iX  and kX  
are mutually accessible (think of a terrain where iX  and kX  settlements are located in the same valley and are 
separated by a steep hill from mX ).
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excitatory-inhibitory connections between the packets serving to constrain 
vector rotation. Figure 15 illustrates these notions.
4. Mental modeling entered the stage (i.e., Sapience emerged) when mental 
processes became decoupled from the motor-sensory feedback. The hypothesis 
is that neuronal machinery of sensory-motor coordination richly developed in 
the protohuman was adopted for the task of mental coordination not accompa-
nied by any overt activities [28]. As a result, neuronal mechanisms could retain 
a rich repertoire of coordination capabilities but became unencumbered by 
the spatio-temporal constraints facing sensory-motor acts (e.g., when raising 
a hand, one cannot skip over intermediate positions or exceed the range and 
speed limits afforded by the muscular-skeletal system. By contrast, envision-
ing the same act does not face such restrictions).
Decoupling from motor-sensory feedback created a gateway into mental 
universe populated by products of composition (imagination). To yield adaptive 
benefits, regulatory mechanisms were needed that would curtail superfluous 
compositions and facilitate those that could be mapped back onto and benefit 
overt behavior (i.e., allow predictions). Understanding is such a mechanism: 
although being rooted in sensory-motor coordination, understanding allows pre-
dictions unrestricted by spatio-temporal limitations of sensory-motor processes 
Figure 14. 
The experience of mental effort. “Call the forgotten thing Z, the first facts with which we felt it was related 
to a, b, and c, and the details finally operative in calling it up 1, m, and n. The activity in Z will at first be 
a mere tension; but as the activities in a, b, and c little by little irradiate into l, m, and n … their combined 
irradiations upon Z succeed in helping the tension there to overcome the resistance, and in rousing Z to full 
activity. Through hovering of the attention in the neighborhood of the desired object, the accumulation of 
associates becomes so great that the combined tensions of their neural processes break through the bar, and the 
nervous wave pours into the tract, which has so long been awaiting its advent” ([56] p. 586).
Figure 13. 
1) elevated arousal combined with diffuse attention equate to increasing temperature across patches in the packet 
network, causing temporary lowering of energy barriers and enabling inter-packet coordination (term ‘cognition’ 
derives from the Latin cogitare: Shaking together [55]. 2) sustained, focused attention equate to targeted energy 
delivery sufficient for local lowering and overcoming of the energy barriers, enabling coordination (term 
explanation derived from the Latin explanare: Flatten, make level or plane (Harper-Collins Dictionary of 
Philosophy, 1992). 3) inter-packet coordination can involve structures residing outside packet network (i.e., 
cortico-thalamo–cortical connections, vs. cortico-cortical connections).
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or the speed of neuronal signaling. At the same time, mental models are subject 
to constraints of a different kind, including the explainability requirement and, 
crucially, limitations imposed by processes (reentrant mapping) that are inherent 
in the coordination mechanisms and allow eliminating superfluous degrees of 
freedom in the model constituents. Figure 16 summarizes assumptions and sug-
gestions in this part, presenting a sketch of functional hierarchy underlying active 
inference.
Figure 15. 
Understanding chess positions. White knight can move to 8 squares, thinking of possible moves involves 
consecutive activation of one place neuron and inhibiting the other seven in the knight packet. Place neuron 
responding to square a in the white pawn packet inhibits the corresponding neuron in the knight packet. As a 
result, the idea of moving knight to square a does not come to mind. Place neuron responding to square b in the 
knight packet excites place neuron b in the pawn packet, and vice versa. As a result, the idea of taking the black 
pawn by either the white pawn or the white knight presents itself prominently (one ‘sees’ the opportunity).
Figure 16. 
Functional architecture underlying active inference. The architecture comprises 6 levels, from subcellular to 
model networks. Subcellular networks at the bottom coordinate movement of mitochondria and substances 
across cell populations and inside cells. The model network on top comprises a multitude of mental models 
spreading across different tasks and domains. Interactions between levels are two directional: Intra-level 
processes form groups of elements that are treated as (composite) elements in the next level above; in turn, 
upper level-processes influence conditions and coordinate groupings in the level below. The packet network 
plays a pivotal role in the architecture, bridging levels shared by all species and those that are unique to the 
humans and become operational gradually in the course of an individual’s cognitive development.
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Emergence of packets underlies perception, i.e., extraction of quasi-stable, bounded 
feature groupings (objects) from the sensory stream (e.g., one can discern and subse-
quently recognize different chess pieces). The relational level is split in two – behavioral 
and relational proper. In the former, different behavior patterns are attributed to the 
objects (e.g., admissible moves are defined for knight, as in Figure 15). In the latter, 
inter-object relations get decoupled from the objects’ sensory contents (e.g., coordina-
tions in Figure 15 make no account of the shape, color, weight, etc. of the participating 
pieces). Finally, operations in the model network support mental experiments (gedan-
ken experiments) – a form of active inference most distant from the control of motor-
sensory feedback. Mental experiments can entail physical experiments but do not rely 
on them in assessing assess the validity of their conclusions.
Ideas and suggestions in this section do not answer questions a and b posed at 
the end of Section 2 but, arguably, indicate directions for further inquiry. Question 
c will be addressed briefly in the discussion. The ideas are speculative, the next 
section references findings and theories in the literature that seem to agree with the 
ideas and might help assessing their biological plausibility.
4.3 Assessing plausibility
A thumbnail summary of the preceding two sections: Cognitive processes yield 
adaptive behavior via two regulatory loops: the first loop optimizes (coordinates) 
deployment of sensory-motor resources while the second loop coordinates deploy-
ment of neuronal resources. The first loop produces associative networks that give 
rise to packet networks, the second loop combines packets into nested coordinated 
structures (mental models). The second loop was decoupled from the motor-sen-
sory feedback, which created an opportunity for constructing unlimited multitudes 
of mental models. Realization of that opportunity was predicated on satisfying 
two constraints: a) using a limited number of neurons and b) maintaining energy 
consumption below some physiologically attainable thresholds. It can be shown that 
mechanisms of packets and packet coordination are deployment heuristics serving 
to satisfy the constraints [11, 12]. Packet coordination underlies understanding, 
which is a form of active inference unique to Sapience. The remainder of this sec-
tion references findings supporting key notions in this proposal.
4.3.1 Tuning neuronal resources
Dynamic allocation of neuronal resources implies that neurons have a degree of 
plasticity, i.e. their receptive fields (RF) can be changed by both the stimuli and, 
crucially, brain systems that regulate allocation. A body of findings in [57–62] pro-
vide ample evidence of such plasticity, including stimulus-driven adaptive plastic-
ity, rapid attention-driven plasticity, and consolidated learning-induced plasticity. 
Rapid attention-driven plasticity manifests in attentional modulation of neuronal 
processes and underlies the ability of the brain to make coordinated changes in 
stimuli-driven and self-directed neuronal activities as the context and task demands 
change. “These transformations occur at the level of synapses, single-neuron RFs, 
and also at the level of brain networks” ([63] p. 252).
4.3.2 Optimizing deployment of neuronal resources
The idea to characterize cognitive processes as resource optimization has been 
explored repeatedly in several forms, as optimization of energetic resources [64], opti-
mization of computing resources [65], optimization of cognitive resources [66]. The 
present theory characterizes cognition as deployment of neuronal resources optimized 
Connectivity and Functional Specialization in the Brain
24
for energy efficiency, under an exceedingly simple model (“neurons fire at stimuli”): 
successful allocation of neurons to streaming stimuli procures energy deposits from 
the stimuli and incurs energy costs (recruiting, firing, maintaining neurons), neuronal 
system seeks to maximize the former while minimizing the latter [12]. It can be shown 
that, under this model, elements of functional architecture in Figure 16 represent heu-
ristics delivering progressively improving energy inflows while reducing energy costs 
(optimal maneuvering of neuronal resources to maximize gains and minimize losses). 
Other major phenomena can be mapped straightforwardly onto the model, e.g. in 
the context of resource optimization, the short term memory/long term memory 
partitioning turns out to be a powerful heuristic involving breaking large optimization 
problems into successions of small ones thus cutting down the amount of computa-
tion while keeping the outcome in the vicinity of global optimum. Optimal alloca-
tion strategies include prediction and anticipatory recruitment (active inference), 
combining those with cost minimization enabled expansion and diversification of 
inference domains. Dynamic resource optimization requires unencumbered access to 
all resources in the resource pool and flexible switching between resource groupings. 
These notions resonate with proposals in the literature, some examples follow.
A model in [67] postulates a global workspace composed of distributed and 
heavily interconnected neurons, and a set of specialized modules conducting 
perceptual, motor, evaluative, and attentional operations. Workspace (regula-
tory) neurons are mobilized in effortful tasks and selectively mobilize or suppress, 
through descending connections, the contribution of specific processor neurons. 
When workspace neurons become spontaneously co- activated, they form spatio-
temporal patterns that are subject to modulation by vigilance signals.
The idea of cost-reward tradeoffs is consistent with the findings in [68]. This study 
examined neuronal substrate responsible for balancing expected performance rewards 
and their cognitive costs. Single-unit recordings in monkeys provided evidence that 
neurons in Medial Frontal Cortex (MFC) encode associations between action sets and 
their rewarding values and are involved in the cost- reward tradeoffs. MFC evaluates 
the costs incurred in executing cognitively demanding tasks and the expected gains, 
and recruits control resources in the Lateral Prefrontal Cortex (LPC) as necessary for 
compensating performance costs. MFC responses also reflect intrinsic MFC processes 
inhibiting inappropriate behaviors and energizing the LPC resources involved in 
selecting alternative behaviors according to the rewards and penalties at stake. The 
ideas concerning the cost-reward tradeoffs are consistent with those in [69].
The overall notion of dynamically optimized recruitment of neuronal resources is 
consistent with findings in [70] associating competent performance across multiple 
domains (“general intelligence”) with selective recruitment of lateral frontal cortex 
in one or both hemispheres. These same frontal regions were found to be recruited 
by a broad range of cognitive demands, thus suggesting that “general intelligence” 
derives from flexibly switching recruitment between different neuronal groups. 
Another facet of neuronal processes implicit in the idea of neuronal resource opti-
mization is “neuronal reuse”, i.e. engaging the same circuitry for different behavioral 
purposes [71]. Combining quasi-stable neuronal packets without changing the 
packets or the underlying mosaic of associative links is a form of reuse. Improving 
energy efficiency can be a factor in the optimization of cerebral cortex layout and 
physical embedding of processing networks in the brain volume [72]): minimization 
of total connection length [73] reduces energy costs of signal propagation.
4.3.3 Improving energy efficiency
Neuronal processes consume significant amount of energy, consumption 
increases with activity which demands local and global changes in metabolic rates 
25
Brain Functional Architecture and Human Understanding
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.95594
and blood flow. Mechanisms of efficiency and energy transduction in the brain 
have been investigated in numerous studies [74–78]. Energy is produced through 
oxygen consumption mediated by the mitochondrial respiratory chain generating 
the high-energy phosphorous metabolite (adenosine triphosphate, or ATP). The 
carbon source that supports the oxidative metabolism is predominantly glucose. 
About 20% of the total oxygen consumption in the body takes place in the brain. 
A detailed account of energy consumption was obtained in a recent study utilizing 
31P-MRS in vivo imaging of the human brain [79]. It was determined that approxi-
mately 5.7 kg of ATP molecules is produced and utilized by the cortical gray and 
white matter in a day, which is equivalent to the complete oxidative combustion of 
56 g glucose per day and is almost five times the total weight of the gray and white 
matter (≈1.2 kg). The energy expenditure of a single cortical neuron is 4.7 billion 
ATPs per second (compared than 3.3 billion ATPs/neuron/sec estimated for the rat 
brain). Approximately 67–75% of the total energy expenditures is used for neu-
rotransmitter signaling and electrophysiological activities involved in sustaining 
neuronal functions [79].
It has been long recognized that the high energetic cost of human brain func-
tion, which is 10 times higher than what would be expected from its weight alone, 
can only be maintained through efficient energy use [80, 81]. Accordingly, theories 
were advanced suggesting that brains evolved to be metabolically efficient [82–84] 
which implies that representations of events and actions should be sculpted to 
involve as few action potentials and active synapses as possible. For optimum 
efficiency, less than 4% of a population of cortical neurons should be activated to 
represent a new event. Neural mechanisms associated with attention restrict the 
volume of cortex in which activity is elevated [85]. The arrangements of neuronal 
systems are thought to allow maximum communication speed with minimal energy 
expenditures [86].
Massive data was accumulated demonstrating reduction of metabolic costs in the 
organization of motor performance and regulation of movement economy [87–93]. 
As noted in [94], metabolic determinants of physical action organization might not 
be the same as those determining cognitive action organization. However, it stands 
to reason to assume that the principle of cost minimization applies in both domains.
Analysis in [85] concludes that strategies directed at maximizing metabolic 
efficiency are indeed used by the brain. In particular, a) fine axon collaterals reduce 
the number of ions required to transmit an action potential, by reducing membrane 
area, b) the arrangement of neurons in maps reduces the distance the potentials 
must travel and c) sparse codes reduce the number of action potentials required to 
represent events. Figure 17 indicates that suggestions in the present theory resonate 
with those formulated in [85] and other studies.
4.3.4 Neuronal packets are building blocks in cognitive processes
The idea that dynamically formed neuronal groupings (assemblies, ensembles) 
are the basic functional units in neuronal processes was advanced by [95] and 
subsequently developed in the Theory of Neuronal Group Selection (TNGS) by 
Gerald Edelman [96–98] and explored in other studies. For example, [99] suggests 
that acquisition of motor skills involves development of motor primitives amenable 
to adaptive re-combination (arguably, motor primitives are rooted in the underlying 
neuronal assemblies), [100] conceptualizes mental synthesis as a synchronization 
of independent neuronal ensembles, etc. Hebb’s idea received experimental support 
in a number of recent findings: studies in [86, 101] demonstrated existence of neu-
ronal assemblies entering into different combinations as the tasks and conditions 
change. Assemblies observed in [86] comprise a few dozen neurons each and can 
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be interlaced within the same volume. It was suggested that “elementary neuronal 
groups are prescribed Lego-like building blocks of perception and that acquired 
memory relies on combining these elementary assemblies into higher-order con-
structs” [86]. Both studies suggest that their findings reveal a synaptic organizing 
principle (i.e., grouping) that is common across animals.
An important elaboration of the notion of assembly received in the idea of 
synergistic structural units formulated in [102–106]. Synergistic structural units can 
be combined into task- specific groupings and, crucially, are amenable to “nonindi-
vidualized control”, that is, their constituent elements can be controlled by a few 
task-related variables (goals) [103].
The notion of ‘neuronal packets’ builds on the idea of Hebbian assembly and is 
consistent with the finding and suggestion referenced above. However, the notion 
offers two crucial extensions to the idea, as follows: a) neuronal packets form as a 
result of phase transition in associative networks causing some subnets to fold into 
cohesive units (packets) and b) folding establishes energy barriers at the packet 
boundaries. Stated differently, boundary energy barriers implement Markov 
blankets separating packet internals from the surrounding network [30]. More 
precisely, the height of energy barriers equals free energy per unit of surface area 
(surface tension) determined by the total membrane surface in the packet’s bound-
ary neurons (i.e., packet’s Markov blanket, see Figure 9). Analysis in [85] identified 
reduction of membrane areas in individual neurons as a factor contributing into 
brain’s metabolic efficiency. In a similar way, thermodynamically-driven tendency 
to minimize packet surface areas [27] contributes to the metabolic efficiency of 
neuronal processes (see Figure 17).
4.3.5 Coordinated rotation of packet vectors
Phase transitions transform groups of associated neurons into cohesive func-
tional units amenable to synergistic control and re-combination with other units 
(reuse). The present theory defines coordinated rotation of packet vectors as a form 
of synergistic control, extending control mechanism described in [51–53, 107–111] 
from controlling overt movements to controlling mental ‘movements’ (i.e., packet 
vector rotation and coordination, see Figure 15). This generalization is consistent 
Figure 17. 
Connected associative network allows unrestricted signal propagation, i.e., excitation of any neuron can ignite 
excitation spreading that will, eventually, engulf the entire network. Formation of packets and operations 
on them minimize spreading, confining excitation to the smallest subset of neurons producing the largest 
expected energy gain. Dynamic resource optimization boils down to suppressing wasteful firing and facilitating 
beneficial firing, i.e. yielding maximum prediction accuracy and response composition optimal under the 
prediction. In that sense, resource optimization is an engine of active inference.
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with the original concept of neuronal assemblies in [95] envisioning the possibility 
of the assemblies producing different responses constituted by different excitation 
trajectories within the assembly, as shown in Figure 18.
The notion of packet vector trajectories appears to be consistent with the 
findings in [112] demonstrating that memorization involves formation of specific 
sequences of spike bursts in the cortex that are replayed during retrieval. The 
function of coordination (neurons kZ  in Figure 15) can be carried out by compo-
nents of basal ganglia, thalamus and other structures. In particular, [113] suggests 
that basal ganglia chunks the representations of motor and cognitive action 
sequences so that they can be implemented as performance units. Studies in [114] 
uncovered activities in basal ganglia circuits that encoded sequences as single 
actions. Besides start/stop signaling and sequence parsing, these neurons displayed 
inhibited or sustained activity throughout the execution of the sequences. This 
sustained activity co-varied with the rate of execution of individual sequence 
elements, consistent with motor concatenation. Direct and indirect pathways of 
basal ganglia were concomitantly active during sequence initiation, but behaved 
differently during performance. Thalamic relays also play a critical role in coordina-
tion [115, 116]. The cerebellum is also involved in the detection and generation of 
sequences [117].
Cortical coordination and dynamics have been analyzed in [118–121] conclud-
ing that “the formation of neural context through the coordinated mutual con-
straint of multiple interacting cortical areas, is considered as a guiding principle 
underlying all cognitive functions” ([120] p. 140). The present theory agrees 
with that conclusion and suggests neuronal mechanisms instantiating the idea. 
In particular, the theory defines mental models as tightly coordinated gestalts, or 
structural units where changes in one component cause reciprocal changes in the 
other ones (e.g. when one hand is used to lift a heavy object from a tray supported 
by the other hand, increasing effort in one hand is concomitant with relaxation in 
the other one – hands form a structural unit (Gelfand et al). The same coordina-
tion mechanism underlies operation of mental models, e. g, in a catapult model, 
increasing distance to the target entails the realization that projectile need to be 
shifted in the opposite direction). The modeling mechanisms includes coordinated 
vector rotation and reentrant mapping.
4.3.6 Reentrant mapping
The hypothesis that reentrant signaling serves as a general mechanism to 
facilitate the coordination of neuronal firing in anatomically and functionally 
segregated cortical areas and in the thalamus is one of the main tenets in the Theory 
of Neuronal Groups Selection (TNGS) [122–124]. According to TNGS, neurons 
Figure 18. 
Neuronal assemblies were conceptualized as complex structures affording different trajectories for excitation 
propagation (adopted from [95]).
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belonging to different cortical areas are reciprocally interconnected by reentrant 
networks of excitatory axons, and each cortical area is also reentrantly intercon-
nected by large numbers of axons to one or more nuclei of the thalamus. These 
thalamocortical and cortico-thalamic reentrant connections modulate brain arousal 
and help determining which of the patterns of environmental signals arriving in the 
thalamus from the environment will be relayed on to the cortex. They also partici-
pate in the execution of timed, sequential, or willed processes, such as manipulat-
ing mental constructs, or issuing segmented motor commands [124]. The present 
theory is consistent with TNGS principles, making reentrant mapping (or bidirec-
tional coupling [113]) integral to the mechanisms of modeling and understanding 
(see Figure 15).
4.3.7 Energy landscapes – a missing link in cognitive neuroscience
It has been long recognized that the concept on neuronal assembly leaves the 
issues of stability and borders undetermined (how does the brain ‘know’ where 
one assembly ends and another begins, how does a neuron ‘know’ to which assem-
bly it belongs, what keeps neurons in an assembly together, etc.)? In the original 
conceptualization [95], waves of excitations develop and reverberate inside 
assemblies - this notion indicates intuition of assembly borders but that intuition 
was not made explicit. The original conceptualization in [95] entailed a possibility 
that activity in any assembly will spread to other assemblies and ultimately to the 
entire cortex or even the total brain, resulting in pathological overactivity, as in 
seizures. To cope with the problem, the idea of a “threshold control mechanism” 
was introduced [125] with the subsequent elaborations placing the mechanism in 
the basal ganglia or the hippocampus. The idea was that a cell assembly “holds” at 
a threshold θ when at that threshold all the neurons of the assembly, once excited, 
stay active due to their reciprocal excitatory connections. Manipulation of the 
thresholds was envisioned as follows (compare to Figure 13(1)).
“A periodic operation (colloquially called the “pump of thoughts”) may involve the 
following steps. Given a certain input I, the threshold is lowered so that the set of 
active neurons FI will go over into a larger set F'I. This will encourage the ignition 
of cell assemblies. As the threshold is again raised, activity is smothered and only 
the most strongly connected cell assembly will survive. A new cycle beginning again 
with a lowered threshold will bring in new cell assemblies. They may include an 
even more strongly connected cell assembly, which will be the next one to survive 
when the threshold is raised. The evolution will be in the direction of the most 
strongly connected cell assemblies…. One may express this by saying that the system 
hunts for an interpretation of the input, or that it ‘thinks” ([125] p.177).
Independently from the proposal in [125], the idea of threshold regulation was 
advanced in a theory of movement coordination (λ theory) in [126–128] According 
to λ theory theory, coordination of motor actions involves centrally controlled 
resetting of the threshold positions of body segments. Deviations from the thresh-
old positions (e.g., restive muscle length) trigger resistive forces, detection of 
differences between the centrally set threshold positions and the sensory-signaled 
actual positions cause activation of neuromuscular elements seeking to diminish 
the difference. The crucial assumption is that thresholds are changed by descending 
fibers that influence membrane potentials of motoneurons in motor cortices, either 
directly or via interneurons [126].
Arguably, theories of threshold regulation [125, 126] are motivated by intuition 
similar to that expressed in Figures 13-15. In the present theory, boundary barriers 
29
Brain Functional Architecture and Human Understanding
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.95594
are an intrinsic property of neuronal assemblies (packets), regulation of barrier 
height involves changes in membrane potential in neurons residing in the packet’s 
MB. Boundary energy barriers make assemblies distinct, quasi-stable and immersed 
in energy landscapes. The landscape curtails activation spreading, by imposing 
energy costs on inter-assembly transitions.
More precisely, the present theory postulates that boundary barriers establish 
energy landscapes across packet networks [10, 12]. Accordingly, formation of 
packets can be viewed as a form of folding, analogous to the folding of proteins and 
other complex molecular structures [129–131]. As in proteins, the folding of packets 
is a spontaneous process obtaining stable (equilibrium) configurations of minimal 
free energy [27]. Stability is maintained within some ranges of temperature varia-
tion (packets dissolve when ( ) ( )T T d T dTσ σ≈ / , mE → 0, the constituent neurons 
become absorbed into the surrounding packets). Within the multidimensional 
energy surface, packets’ Markov Blankets and the corresponding cutsets (links 
connecting MB to the surrounding packets) form attraction basins in the neighbor-
hood of local minima, connected by saddle points. As a result, attentive navigation 
of the landscape involves energy-demanding (effortful) basin-to-basin transitions. 
Deformations in the energy landscape determine changes in the accessibility of 
neuronal packets. Presumably, transitions are controlled by frontal /prefrontal 
networks and thalamic structures.
A number of experimental results appear to agree with the proposal. Findings 
in [132] demonstrating fast transitions between separated states of cortical activity 
involving distinct neuronal groups appear to agree with above proposal. Findings 
in [133] indicate that thalamic cells respond selectively to complex percepts and 
concepts conferred on them by the cortical assemblies in whose activation they 
participate. The cortico-thalamo-cortical pathways provide connections between 
different cortical loci which have higher reliability than the direct cortico-cortical 
routes, and play crucial role in orchestrating activation of those assemblies). 
Important findings in [134] demonstrated that brain network are structured in a 
manner optimized for network control, which includes increased controllability 
and reduced synchronizability (controllability characterizes the ease of switching 
from one dynamical state to another, traversing energy landscape (see Figure 130; 
synchronizability characterizes the ability for regions in the network to support the 
same temporal dynamical patterns).
The idea of energy landscapes in brain systems remained purely speculative until 
the recent pioneering studies in [135–137] applied modern analytic and modeling 
techniques (e.g. network disconnectivity analysis) to fMRI data, seeking to define 
energy landscapes in Default Mode Network (DMN) and Fronto Parietal Network 
(FPN). It was determined that DMN energy landscape consisted of two groups of 
low-energy local minima that are separated by a relatively high energy barrier. Within 
each group, the activity patterns of the local minima were similar, and different 
minima were connected by relatively low energy barriers. In the FPN, all dominant 
local minima were separated by relatively low energy barriers such that they formed 
a single coarse-grained global minimum. The height of energy barriers separating 
local minima influences the rate of inter-state transitions. Accordingly, transitions in 
DNM occur at a low rate while transitions between local minima in FPN occur more 
easily. The notion that brain operates at the edge of instability and transits between 
low energy states has been explored in multiple studies [50, 138]). It appears that 
the notion of brain energy landscapes was introduced  in [10, 12], and experimental 
mapping of energy landscapes was attempted for the first time in [136].
To summarize, the folding of subnets in associative networks forms packets 
separated by Markov Blankets from the rest of the network. Packet Markov Blankets 
are constituted by boundary energy barriers that make packets distinct, quasi-stable 
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stable (i.e., amenable to modification but at substantial energy cost) and synergistic 
(i.e. amenable to control by a few variables and coordination with other packets). 
Boundary barriers establishes energy landscapes across packet networks and deter-
mine both kinematic (inter-packet transitions) and dynamic properties of neuronal 
organization.
4.3.8 Accommodations
It was suggested that lateral inhibition prevents neuronal assemblies from 
encroaching on each other while the tendency towards reducing surface tension in 
the packets favors their coalescence (minimizing the amount of free energy in the 
surface). Arguably, the interplay of the opposite tendencies drives ‘accommodation’, 
that is, spontaneous adjustments inside the neuronal systems following changes 
resulting from interactions with the environment [27].
The notions of assimilation, accommodation and cognitive equilibration were 
introduced in [18] denoting, correspondingly, integration of new information into 
the existing structures, re-organization of those structures, until a state of equilib-
rium is reached obtaining a sufficient degree of integration via a minimal amount of 
structural changes. According to the present theory, assimilation involves changes 
in the distribution of synaptic weights, that trigger waves of packet re-structuring 
propagating throughout the packet network (the accommodation). In this way, the 
requirement of spontaneous re-structuring is inherent in the notion of neuronal 
packets immersed in energy landscapes. On that view, the overall functional archi-
tecture of the cognitive systems was reduced to three modules: associative cortices, 
reticular formation controlling arousal level, and a frontal/prefrontal module 
controlling landscape navigation. Accommodation and assimilation are confined to 
packet networks [10].
Recent experimental findings and theoretical proposals [139] envision func-
tional architecture comprising Default Mode Network (DMN) [140], Salience 
Network (SN) [141] and Task Control Network (TCN) [142], as follows. A DMN 
is a large network comprises hubs in medial prefrontal cortex, posterior cingulate/
precuneus and angular gyrus becomes active under conditions of wakeful rest, i.e. 
when person is not engaged in any task. The SN comprises a suite of brain regions 
whose cortical hubs are the anterior cingulate and ventral anterior insular cortices 
while the TCN (a cingulo-opercular task-control network) is anchored in the dorsal 
anterior insula and the frontal operculum. SN detects behaviorally relevant stimuli 
and recruits neural resources to orchestrate responses. For the latter, the SN engages 
the TCN (or Central Executive) whose functions include maintaining relevant task 
set or orchestrate switching to a new task set in response to shifts in the salience 
landscape.
Significantly, a comprehensive study in [143] compared functional networks 
in the brain during task performance (active brain) and at rest (resting brain), 
concluding that the full repertoire of functional networks utilized in active brain 
(Active Brain Networks, or ABN) remains continuously active in the resting brain 
(Resting State Networks, or RSN, including the “default mode network”). The 
study applied independent component analysis (ICA) and other modern techniques 
to two sets of fMRI functional imaging data: “active brain” data in the BrainMap 
data base collected from over 30,000 subjects, and resting brain data collected 
from 36 subjects. The ICA decomposition was conducted at two resolution levels, 
20-component analysis and 70-component analysis, with the higher resolution 
analysis revealing subnetworks in the primary networks determined at the lower 
resolution level. It was found that primary networks split into subnetworks in both 
active and resting data in almost identical ways, maintaining greater functional 
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(temporal) correlation between subnetworks within a primary network than across 
primary networks. Analysis in both levels produced converging results: close to 70% 
overlap in the composition of Active State Network and Resting State Networks. 
The analysis concludes with an admission: “Although we have shown that activa-
tion networks are mirrored in resting data, we must acknowledge that this does not 
begin to answer the question of why the brain’s many regions continue to “function” 
(with large amplitude fluctuations) when the subject is at rest, and even when the 
subject is asleep and under anesthesia” [143].
It appears that these findings are consistent with the proposal in [10] envision-
ing waves of accommodating adjustments in packet networks. Moreover, the 
adjustment requirements are inherent in the notion of packet networks. In particu-
lar, the hypothesis is that variations in temperature and synaptic weight distribution 
across packet networks cause changes in the resting membrane potentials [144] in 
the MB neurons, thus creating potential gradients in the packet network causing 
adjustments in the energy landscape and re-distribution of neurons seeking packet 
configurations in the vicinity of global energy minima. Stated differently, energy 
landscape is “frustrated” [131] due to conflicting tendencies of lateral inhibition 
and lateral coalescence. Spontaneous re-organizations in packet networks to resolve 
frustration move the system in the direction of cognitive equilibrium. Possibly, 
neuronal avalanches are a form of such re-organization, playing a role in maintain-
ing network stability and preventing runaway excitation [145]. Figure 19 makes 
suggestions regarding the placement of packet networks in the tri-partite architec-
ture [139, 146].
Figure 19 suggests that DMN/SN/CEN interplay focuses on the engagement 
of prefrontal areas in coordination activities, i.e., formation of relations and 
operations on relational networks. Accordingly, it can be expected that prefrontal 
damages are likely to cause severe deficits in integration of relations. The order 
of operation in the DMN/SN/CEN system is, roughly, as follows: a) the Central 
Executive Network includes the agency of attention and controls attention focus-
ing and other processes engaged in the performance of cognitive tasks, b) the 
Default Mode Network becomes active when the person remains awake but no 
tasks are pursued, c) the Salience Network administers switching between CEN 
and DMN.
Figure 19. 
Operations on networks underlying understanding capacity involve an interplay between default mode network 
and central executive network (CEN). Salience network coordinates switching between DMN and CEN [146]. 
This general architecture allows more detailed mapping onto anatomical structures in the brain underlying 
functional organization [147–149].
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4.3.9 Decoupling
The present theory attributes emergence of human understanding to evolution-
ary developments causing decoupling of regulatory processes from the sensory-
motor feedback loops [10, 28]. The idea is consistent with suggestions in [150] 
regarding evolutionary origins of human cognition. Analysis [150] focuses on the 
development of cerebral cortex, pointing at its vast expansion in the humans relative 
to other primates (the cerebral surface area is 120 cm2 in the macaque and 960 cm2 
in the human) and disproportionate expansion of distributed association regions 
within the cortex. The hypothesis is that rapid expansion of the cortical mantle may 
have decoupled (“untethered”) large portions of the cortex from sensory hierarchies 
and resulted in the development of networks that either control processes in the 
sensory networks or are engaged in parallel activities that are “detached from sensory 
perception and motor actions – what one might term ‘internal mentation” [150].
5. Discussion and conclusions
In a letter to Nature Neuroscience entitled “What does ‘understanding’ mean”?, 
the author confesses that “upon reflection, it is depressing, if not scandalous, to 
realize how rarely I ask myself this” [151]. Arguably, the letter’s intent was not to 
confess ignorance or lack of interest but to point out that a critically important issue 
has been long neglected. There is nothing that one is familiar more intimately and 
directly with than sensations of confusion, mental effort and understanding (except, 
perhaps, for the sensations of one’s own breathing and heart beating), yet the issue 
of understanding has not been receiving significant attention in cognitive sciences 
(see some discussion in [27, 152]). The intent of this chapter was to suggest that a 
theory of understanding might be within reach (and grasp), requiring the synthesis 
of new ideas and the long existing ones, re-evaluated in the light of new data. The 
proposed theoretical framework is that of active inference [13, 14] carried out under 
the requirements of limited neuronal pool size and minimized energy expenditures. 
Within that framework, the meaning of ‘understanding’ reduces to optimization 
strategy in the deployment of neuronal resources that enables expanding domains of 
inference while minimizing expansion costs. In subjective experiences, the meaning 
of understanding reduces to attaining ‘grasp’, i.e. unifying some disparate entities, in 
a coordinated relational structure that enables relational [153, 154] and other forms 
of reasoning. Attaining ‘grasp’ can be accompanied by cognitive strain and culmi-
nates in exhilaration and euphoria making the activity self-rewarding (the Greek 
euporia stands for ‘easy passage or travel’ while its opposite aporia denotes ‘difficulty 
or impossibility of passage’ [48]). This section will compare the present proposal to 
some findings in the literature, aiming to suggest directions for further research.
5.1 Mental simulations
The phenomenon of mental modeling (mental simulations) has been addressed 
in a number of studies [155–157], focusing on the “paradox” of endogenously-
driven mental activity:” how can findings that carry conviction result from a new 
experiment conducted entirely within the head” [155]. Data has been accumulated 
demonstrating that mental simulations engage mechanisms that are different from 
those involved in reasoning based on descriptive knowledge, exhibit analogue prop-
erties, and can produce correct inferences when descriptive knowledge is lacking. 
At the same time, it was observed that mental simulations proceed in a piecemeal 
fashion (not a holistic image) [157].
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The present proposal pivots on the notion that mental modeling was made pos-
sible by decoupling regulatory processes from the motor-sensory feedback, which 
shifted the power of conviction from experiments in the world to experiments in 
the head (e.g., arguments in Pythagorean theorem are entirely convincing but not 
amenable to experimental verification). On the account of the present theory, the 
experience of understanding accompanies formation of tightly coordinated gestalts 
which, simultaneously, afford some degrees of freedom to their constituents. 
Exploring these degrees of freedom can indeed proceed in a step-by-step fashion, 
i.e. experimental findings in [157] and are not incompatible with the theory. Other 
proposals in the recent literature addressing the role of mental simulation [158] 
resonate with the key notions in this theory.
5.2 Transient assemblies and the searchlight hypothesis
The operation of focused attention was compared to a searchlight that shifts 
between and thus helps forming conjunctions of separate attributes or features of 
perceived objects [159]. It was further proposed that functions of the “searchlight” 
are carried out by activity bursts in thalamic nuclei while conjunctions are imple-
mented by rapidly modifiable synapses (called Malsburg synapses), orchestrated by 
the bursts to produce transient cell assemblies [160].
Notwithstanding suggestions in [159, 160] concerning transient assemblies, 
considering the role of focused attention in manipulating quasi-stable assemblies 
(packets) calls for a different metaphor. A neuronal packet is a superposition of 
multiple behavior patterns afforded by an object. Overcoming energy barrier and 
shifting attention from outside the packet to the inside (see Figure 13(2)) actualizes 
one of the patterns. Think of ‘grasp’ as seizing an object and holding it in a closed 
fist, followed by opening the fist and holding the object in an open palm. With the 
eyes closed, one needs to run the fingertip of another hand over the object in order 
to discern its shape. The point is that concentrating attention amounts to focusing 
energy delivery on particular neurons causing their excitation or inhibition, which 
gives rise to the experience of a behaving object. In short, both the searchlight and 
the fingertip metaphors define attention as physical actions applied to neurons. 
However, the former metaphor conjures up an image of a wandering light beam fall-
ing on the elements of neuronal structures and thus making them discernable to the 
“mind’s eye” while the latter one connotes the image of a finger (or stick) ‘tapping’ 
on the neurons, which seems to better represent the notion of physical action.
5.3 Understanding and language
The discovery of mirror neurons inspired hopes that understanding of the origins 
of language can be “within our grasp” [161] Mirror neurons discharge during active 
movements of the hand or mouth (or both) performed by the subject or observed 
being performed by others (hence, the mirror neurons). It was hypothesized that the 
latter feature establishes a bridge from ‘doing’ to ‘communicating’, or from acting to 
message sending [161, 162]. Other hypothesis concerning language origins attribute its 
emergence to internal, as opposed to communicative, functions [35–37] and concep-
tualize language mechanisms as the manipulation of neuronal assemblies [163, 164]. 
This theory offers an opinion that seems to unify all three hypotheses, as follows.
First, note that mirror neurons were determined to be of three types: ‘grasp-
ing with the hand’ neurons, ‘holding’ neurons and ‘tearing’ neurons [161]. Apply 
these notions to manipulation of mental ‘objects’ (as opposed to physical ones) 
and assume that ‘grasping with the hand’ denotes formation of a packet, ‘holding’ 
denotes the state when attention is “hovering outside” the packet (see Figure 14), 
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and ‘tearing’ denotes entering the packet and experiencing the contents. A reversible 
‘holding’ – ‘tearing’ transition corresponds to set operation: a manifold of features is 
experienced as a unity (one object) devoid of (separated from) any sensory con-
tents, followed by experiencing a series of sensory features comprised in the object.
Next, think of watching a play performed on the stage, and then consider the 
same play being read to you. In the latter case, assume that the cast of characters and 
all the names have been removed so only the text proper remained. It is not hard to 
realize that figuring out what is going on might be possible but extremely difficult, 
requiring forming and comparing different word combinations (e.g. “The queen, 
my lord, is dead. She should have died hereafter…” – who is talking here? Note that 
you are facing no such challenges when watching the play). Finally, imagine that 
only the cast of characters and names are extracted from the text and the rest is 
discarded. Clearly, it can be very hard but possible to make some sense of the former 
version while the latter one makes no sense at all. It is also evident that the range 
of understanding in the former version will be restricted to a few characters and a 
few consecutive episodes, with the text becoming an impenetrable mess after that. 
Restoring the original text (putting the names back where they belong) resolves the 
otherwise insurmountable difficulty. Here comes a tentative proposal:
Emergence of language followed decoupling from the sensory-motor feedback 
while retaining the mechanisms of sensory-motor coordination. Language emerged 
as a means to support mental coordination over an expanding variety of mental 
objects, by adopting the mechanisms of communicative signaling and re-purposing 
them for self-signaling (communicative signals make an animal aware of a predator 
or other condition without direct sensory confirmation of that condition). Symbols 
(labels) are implemented as neuronal assembles [163, 164] or ‘symbol packets’ 
attached to ‘object packets’, ‘symbol packets’ have no sensory content except for the 
minimum required for making them distinct. Symbols make one roughly aware 
of the contents of a packet without the expense of entering and examining these 
contents, thus facilitating landscape navigation (think of labels attached to drawers 
that need to be pulled with effort). The process of thinking alternates reversibly 
between the packet arrays (roughly, between words and images and actions they 
signify). Understanding phrases involves syntactic coordination and, crucially, 
substantive, or grounded [165] coordination (i.e., between the objects and activi-
ties signified by the words). Findings in [166] demonstrating “grasping ideas with 
the motor system”, i.e. activation of the motor cortex by words referring to bodily 
actions, even idiomatically, other results [167] appear to support these contentions.
5.4 Cognitive disorders
Pathological malfunctions in the operation of the DMN/SN/CEN system 
(Figure 19) can cause breakdowns in the regulation of energy landscapes (energy 
barriers are rigid and remain abnormally high or abnormally low), entailing a range 
of cognitive disorders. In particular, abnormally high barriers hamper correlation 
between cortical areas and interactions between frontal and parietal, neostriatum, 
and thalamic areas involved in attention control, which can manifest in perfor-
mance impairments characteristic of the autism spectrum disorders [168–170]. 
By contrast, abnormally low barriers entail destabilization and disintegration of 
neuronal packets, leading to irreversible memory losses and other impairments 
characteristic of the Alzheimer’s – type disorders (e.g., subjects can be expected 
to fail clock drawing tests due to the inability to recollect proper elements and/or 
their respective positions [171]. In general, abnormally high energy barriers degrade 
functional connectivity between memory elements (percepts, concepts) while 
abnormally low barriers degrade the elements. It appears possible to relate a variety 
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of cognitive disorders (e.g. different forms and stages of dementia) to persistent 
abnormalities in energy landscapes, which can potentially lead to new insights and 
unified approaches in the diagnosis and treatment.
To conclude, this chapter suggested a hand-in-glove relationship between an 
information-theoretic account of cognitive processes (active inference) and a 
thermodynamics-centered account asserting that neuronal mechanisms underlying 
active inference are sculpted by physical conditions in the brain limiting its volume 
and energy supply. Active inference has been conceptualized as a regulatory process 
allowing organisms to operate within the sensory-motor feedback loop. This is 
accomplished by forming generative models that anticipate consequences of overt 
actions as those are reflected in the sensory inflows, followed by adjustments that 
reconcile the actions and the models in a manner serving to satisfy the survival and 
other needs. This chapter applied the active inference framework to define regula-
tory mechanisms decoupled from the motor-sensory feedback loop, under the 
notion of energy-minimizing deployment of neuronal resources.
Advanced theoretical analysis seeking to unite conceptual foundations of the 
physical sciences and biology is uncovering a profound unity of the information-the-
oretic and thermodynamics-centered viewpoints, spanning the range from inanimate 
matter to the most complex life forms [172]. Moreover, recent experimental findings 
demonstrate the possibility of information-to-energy conversion [173]. Analysis indi-
cates that self-organization obtains access to progressively higher degrees of order and 
organization in the channels of energy transduction [172]. The notion of increasing 
levels of coordination in the brain functional architecture, from subcellular processes 
to mental modeling, appears to agree with this general principle. Evolutionary climb to 
the upper reaches of organization manifested in creative thinking was made possible 
by minimizing energy costs in every step. On the present theory, active inference is the 
result and expression of that underlying, thermodynamically- enforced frugality.
In machine intelligence, the bulk of effort has been concentrated on learning 
techniques derived from the perceptron idea (conditioning). This proposal suggests 
advancing from machine learning to machine understanding, requiring a differ-
ent conceptual foundation. It has been argued that human understanding requires 
awareness, and physical processes in the brain that evoke awareness might not be 
amenable to computational simulation [174]. Notwithstanding these arguments, it 
appears possible to construct artifacts possessing a level of understanding that does 
not reach human heights but exceeds those accessible to the conventional technology.
It feels appropriate to end this chapter by giving credit to those whose foresight 
brought them long ago to conclusions similar to those expressed here:
“It is worth while to speculate about cell assemblies as an alternative to feature 
detectors and hierarchies of classificatory units. These concepts are related to 
Perceptrons. Similarly, cell assemblies would find their technological analogue in a 
(non existing) Conceptron. … It would be surprising if it turned out that the real 
brain makes use only of one or the other scheme. Most likely the two schemes are used 
in combination, with the hierarchical organization predominating at the sensory 
and motor periphery of the nervous system, and the cell assemblies in between. From 
this point of view the cerebral cortex would seem a good place for cell assemblies, 
and we have seen that it contains the necessary equipment” [125] p. 187
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